view, it will be much more difficult to restore public trust in government and thereby buttress the legitimacy of the political system.
Much of this debate centers on the Trust in Government Index, a series of survey questions in the biennial National Election Study that are used to construct measures of political trust.
1 Unfortunately, these survey questions speak to a limited conception of trust, in which trust in government is contrasted with cynicism or an individual's feeling of alienation from, or hostility toward, government. Yet, trust is a complex, multifaceted concept. It has cognitive, emotional, and behavioral components that operate at both the interpersonal and institutional levels. Accordingly, this article takes a more broad look at the multiple components of trust to address a narrowly tailored question regarding trust in government. That is, what can we do to maintain, restore, or create public trust in government agencies and their employees?
Recently, a panel of public and nonprofit managers, academics, and individuals from the private sector attempted to answer this question. In 1991, U.S. Secretary of Energy James D. Watkins established the Task Force on Radioactive Waste Management and asked the group to make recommendations as to how the Department of Energy (DOE) could strengthen public trust and confidence in its civilian and defense radioactive waste programs.
2 This was a daunting task because the DOE's radioactive waste management programs suffered from a great deal of public distrust. To aid them in their work, the task force asked me to prepare a background paper that summarized current knowledge on the means through which public and private organizations can build trust in their environments. At the time, I thought this would be a relatively easy task: I would simply cull hypotheses from journals and texts in organization theory, public administration, and related disciplines. Surprisingly, this strategy netted very little.
Organization theory, for example, despite its breadth, is relatively devoid of references to specific means through which organizations can build trust in their environments. Only recently has research emerged that speaks directly to the issue of maintaining or building interorganizational trust in the private sector (Husted, 1989; Mishra, 1995; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992 . Concepts other than trust-such as dependence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) , transaction (Williamson, 1985) , and legitimacy (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991) -have instead served as analytic linchpins at the interorganizational level. At the intraorganizational level, the literature on trust is extensive and well established, but it focuses on the links between employer-employee relations, job satisfaction, and organizational productivity (Deluga, 1994; Fairholm, 1994; Frey, 1993; Miller, 1992; Ouchi, 1981) . It thus tells us little about trust outside the organization. The same pattern is largely repeated in the literature on public organizations. Several authors address the links between employer-employee relations, job satisfaction, and the productivity of public agencies (Carnevale & Wechsler, 1992; Culbert & McDonough, 1986; Daley, 1991) . Yet, only recently have authors given serious attention to the production, maintenance, and restoration of public trust in government agencies (La Porte & Metlay, 1996; Ruscio, 1996) .
The word trust does not even appear in the indexes of most books on public administration, management, or policy. There are some notable exceptions, of course. Yates (1982) argues that street-level bureaucrats depend on public trust in delivering services: "Once the trust relationship has broken down, public employees find it more difficult to perform their tasks" (p. 124). Chisholm (1989, p. 118) reports that informal coordination among public employees in different agencies depends on mutual trust. Political appointees, according to Heclo (1977, pp. 158-159) , cultivate relationships based on trust with civil servants to be effective within agencies. Conversely, a lack of trust in bureaucrats, according to Kelman (1990, pp. 14, 27) , leads political principals to develop elaborate rules to constrain agency discretion, which, in turn, stifle performance in jobs requiring creativity. 3 Together, these books leave the reader with the impression that trust is an important variable in the environment of public agencies but with no clear sense of what trust means or how it can be produced, maintained, or restored.
In sum, our instrumental knowledge about building, maintaining, or recovering public trust is quite limited-despite routine laments about the loss of trust in government. In light of the limited research on public trust in government agencies and their employees, this article reviews the broad literature on trust in the social sciences to generate a model that can help us think about how public officials (and their academic educators) can produce, maintain, and perhaps even restore public trust. Although the restoration of trust in government is a daunting task, public officials should take heart in at least two respects. First, citizens generally perceive their concrete experiences with individual agencies in a favorable light (Goodsell, 1994, pp. 25-29) . Second, the general public knows relatively little about most agencies; therefore, survey responses to questions about trust in specific agencies probably suffer from a halo effect from prior questions about general trust in government (Citrin, 1993, p. 6) . Together, these observations suggest that public trust in government agencies and their employees can be produced and maintained on the margin.
THREE CONCEPTIONS OF TRUST
Trust has been a topic of moral and social philosophy for hundreds of years. Numerous conceptions of trust have been advanced and refined, the most prominent of which are outlined below. Despite the breadth and depth of this literature and the relatively recent efforts of Baier (1986) , Blau (1964) , Luhmann (1979) , Williamson (1993), and Zucker (1986) to grapple with and define the concept in theoretically productive ways, it is surprising that trust has made so little headway into the literature on public organizations and their environments. Some authors even neglect to define trust when using the concept as a theoretically important variable.
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Because of such oversights and because researchers differ in their approaches to trust, I devote considerable effort below to fleshing out various conceptions of trust prior to discussing trust production and maintenance.
Definitions of trust generally include some reference to expectations or beliefs that others will behave in a predictable manner (Luhmann, 1979 ), a manner not devoted entirely to self-interest (Williamson, 1993, p. 482; Zucker, 1986, p. 57) . Rather than trusting others to be self-interested, we trust them to take our interests into account, even in situations in which we are unable to recognize, evaluate, or thwart potentially negative courses of action on their part (La Porte & Metlay, 1996, p. 342) . Violating these expectations disrupts trust, but does not necessarily generate distrust. As Zucker (1986) argues, "Distrust only emerges when the suspicion arises that the disruption of expectations in one exchange is likely to generalize to other transactions" (p. 59).
In its purest form, trust is based on beliefs rather than expectations. Expectations imply that we are calculating the probabilities individuals will pursue particular courses of action. This is a weaker form of trust than simply believing that others will do good by us, without necessarily knowing what "doing good" entails. As March and Olsen (1989) argue, "the core idea of trust is that it is not based on an expectation of its justification" (p. 27). I, nevertheless, use the term expectation because it captures a more broad range of meanings. Without being precise, suffice it to say that trust exists along a continuum: The more we calculate the intentions of others, expect something specific in return, and subsequently monitor their performance, the less we are exhibiting trust. Similarly, the more others take our interests into account, putting their own interests aside in the process, the more they are worthy of our trust.
The three conceptions of trust outlined below generally include these characteristics. These conceptions are (a) fiduciary trust, which is notable for asymmetric relationships and attendant opportunities for malfeasance; (b) mutual trust, which develops between individuals who repeatedly interact with one another; and (c) social trust, which is embedded within institutions we know in common and take for granted.
FIDUCIARY TRUST
One long-standing conception of public trust in government arises from the notion of fiduciary relationships, in which an individual places trust in another to act in his or her capacity. Fiduciary trust emerges in principal-agent relationships when principals are unable to monitor or control the performance of their agents and are therefore vulnerable to both malfeasance and misfeasance. In such cases, the asymmetric relationship is supported by the unilateral obligation of the trustee to act in the other's interest. The principal trusts the agent, but the agent need not trust the principal.
Trust in professionals is one example of fiduciary trust. Because knowledge is distributed asymmetrically, patients and clients place their trust in doctors and lawyers because they are unable to monitor performance. As Barber (1983) writes, Technically competent performance can be monitored insofar as it is based on shared knowledge and expertise. But when some parties to a social relationship or some members of a social system cannot comprehend that expertise, performance can be controlled by trust. A fiduciary obligation is placed on the holder and user of the special knowledge and skill with regard to the other members of his social system. (p. 15) In fiduciary relationships, individuals are trusted to carry out their duties in regards to others while not taking excessive personal advantage of their privileged position. The greater the asymmetry, the more the relationship depends on this moral obligation. It is therefore crucial that professional schools instill this sense of obligation-particularly because professional associations sometimes become self-serving, losing sight of the interests of their clients as they protect their organizational prerogatives. Yates (1982) labels this behavior guild professionalism.
Fiduciary trust is an important component of public trust in government (Barber, 1983; Kass, 1994) . The relationship is highly asymmetric because it is difficult for citizens to know what their agents in government are doing and to monitor and control their performance. Elected officials can be voted out of office, but civil servants are relatively immune from such control. Therefore, citizens must place their trust in government agencies and their employees to act in their interest. In this regard, Kass (1990) argues that the appropriate role for public officials is stewardship, or "the administrator's willingness and ability to earn the public trust by being an effective and ethical agent in carrying out the republic's business" (p. 113). Stewardship implies more than simply being an efficient and professional technocrat. Public officials should also be "informed by, and subordinated to, the ethical norms of justice and beneficence" (Kass, 1990, p. 114) .
But just what are these norms? Beneficence-the act of doing good-requires an ethical standard. There are at least three standards we might consider. Public officials can follow uniform rules and standard operating procedures that (attempt to) treat everyone equally. They can also heed the golden rule, treating each citizen as they would have other public officials treat them under similar circumstances. Notably, both of these ethical standards ignore the specific, individualistic concerns of citizens themselves. For this reason, we should also consider care as an appropriate ethical standard (Baier, 1986; Noddings, 1984) . Rather than following uniform procedures or doing what we believe is best for others, caring requires taking the specific interest of each citizen into account as a basis for action. As Noddings (1984) argues, "When we care, we consider the other's point of view, his objective needs, and what he expects of us" (p. 24).
Rule-bound behavior presents a gauze of neutrality, the appearance of fairness, but it stifles the ability of public officials to care for the individual citizens with whom they interact. Examining fiduciary trust from the standpoint of care therefore entails giving agency employees greater discretion to consider and respond to the needs of each citizen with whom they interact. It also means inculcating the norms of care within agencies and professional schools. Unfortunately, ethics courses are not currently part of the core curriculum in most graduate schools of public policy and administration. Averch and Dluhy (1992) did not find ethics courses required at any of the 16 Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management (APPAM) and 35 National Association of Schools of Affairs and Administration (NASPAA) schools they reviewed. Microeconomic courses, which aim to increase the efficiency of government programs, are standard, as are management courses, which strive to improve organizational effectiveness. Without denying the importance of these courses, why is ethics not given similar consideration? If ethics were added to this stew, we would have an opportunity to heighten public officials' sense of fiduciary obligation, and thereby give citizens reasons to place their trust in government. Moreover, rather than continuing to instill a paternalistic, technocratic, rule-bound orientation in students, professional schools should give serious attention to care as an appropriate ethical standard by which public officials can fulfill their fiduciary obligation.
The content of ethics courses (whether required or optional) is certainly open to debate; but the following discussion of mutual trust will demonstrate why microeconomic analysis cannot provide an adequate alternative to ethics, at least not with regard to understanding or restoring public trust in government.
MUTUAL TRUST
Mutual trust is more symmetric than fiduciary trust. Mutual trust also differs from fiduciary trust in that it is always interpersonal. Whereas a public agency can be the recipient of fiduciary trust, individuals develop interpersonal relationships based on mutual trust. Accordingly, a student and a public school teacher can develop mutual trust, and the student's feelings toward the teacher may extend to expectations the student has with regard to other teachers in the public school, but the student cannot develop a relationship of mutual trust with the school. Nevertheless, it makes sense to say that the student's trust in this public organization increases because of the mutual trust she has developed with her teacher. Because street-level bureaucrats are the primary point of contact between citizens and public organizations, it is important to understand how mutual trust develops, in what ways mutual trust buttresses fiduciary trust, and whether mutual trust is itself desirable in public-private relationships.
Because mutual trust is often confused with cooperative behavior, it is important to begin by distinguishing trust from cooperation. Trust increases the propensity for individuals to cooperate, but the existence of cooperation does not imply that individuals necessarily trust one another. As Oliver Williamson (1993) argues, formal theorists often use the word trust to describe cooperative behavior that is calculated and self-serving rather than trusting. "Prisoners' dilemma" experiments (Axelrod, 1984; Deutsch, 1973) , for example, merely identify the antecedents to cooperative behavior, such as the ability to communicate and repeated trials, but they do not establish whether the decision to cooperate is based on trust. Axelrod (1984) was careful to observe this distinction when analyzing the stability of cooperation in his tournament of computer programs:
The foundation of cooperation is not really trust, but the durability of the relationship. . . . Whether the players trust each other or not is less important in the long run than whether the conditions are ripe for them to build a stable pattern of cooperation with each other. (p. 182) Moreover, experiments with human subjects are structured differently than social interaction. Not only are they time bound, the decision by research subjects to be "in the game" allows them to suspend social presuppositions and responsibilities as well as to "leave the game" whenever they choose (Garfinkel, 1963, p. 207) . Trust includes cognitive, emotional, and behavioral components, but such experiments do not distinguish the degree to which these components are present at various stages of iterated games or how they are interrelated. Given that game theory does not consider how beliefs are acquired, formal theorists end up finding more equilibria-"usually more uncooperative ones"-than, in fact, exist in the real world (Gambetta, 1988, p. 217) . Blau (1964) addressed such concerns by drawing a distinction between economic and social exchange. Economic exchange rests on formalized contracts that stipulate the exact quantities of a good to be exchanged, whereas social exchange involves the reciprocity of favors, in which the exact nature and timing of some future return is "definitely not stipulated in advance" (p. 93). An individual's failure to discharge social-exchange obligations at some later date subjects him to group sanctions but not legal sanctions. According to Blau, An individual is obligated to the banker who gives him a mortgage on his house merely in the technical sense of owing him money, but he does not feel personally obligated in the sense of experiencing a debt of gratitude to the banker, because all the banker's services, all costs and risks, are duly taken into account in and fully repaid by the interest on the loan he receives. A banker who grants a loan without adequate collateral, however, does make the recipient personally obligated for this favorable treatment, precisely because this act of trust entails a social exchange that is superimposed upon the strictly economic transaction. (p. 94) Although the "impersonal economic market is designed to strip specific commodities of these entangling alliances," many supposedly economic exchanges nevertheless contain social obligations (Blau, 1964, p. 96 ).
Yet, Blau's exchange theory does not clearly distinguish transactions based on reciprocity, obligation, and trust from transactions based on calculated self-interest. Williamson (1993) , by contrast, attempts to establish a clear delineation between these forms of exchange and thereby demarcate the boundary between economics and sociology. Williamson begins by noting that economics is "decidedly more calculative" (p. 453) than the other social sciences, whereas trust is "nearly noncalculative" (p. 479). Because calculated behavior forms the basis of most economic transactions, Williamson argues that using the term trust only confuses analyses. Indeed, many writers, particularly rational-choice theorists, use trust and risk synonymously, such that "trust is warranted when the expected gain from placing oneself at risk to another is positive, but not otherwise" (p. 463). If rational actors are simply calculating expected payoffs based on perceived risks, as in a prisoners' dilemma game, then trust is not present, and risk is a more precise term. Williamson (1993, pp. 469-475) takes this further, however, arguing that if observed behavior can be explained in calculative terms, then trust should not be part of the explanation. This parsimonious model leads us to believe that any behavior that looks calculated is calculated. Based on this logical distinction, Williamson seeks to sweep trust out of economic analysis as well as economic relationships. Although convenient for economists, trust cannot and should not be swept out of government, where moral obligations buttress asymmetrical relationships. Transaction cost economics, based as it is on the explicit assumption that individuals are not merely self-interested but seek their own self-interest "with guile" (Williamson, 1993, p. 458) , leads to excessively cynical interpretations of interpersonal relationships. Indeed, Williamson only grudgingly concedes that "trust, if it obtains at all, is reserved for very special relations between family, friends, and lovers" (p. 484).
Maintaining a distinction between mutual trust and calculated behavior is nevertheless useful because individuals indeed calculate whether to interact with others based on perceived risks. They also trust, often without knowing what the risks may be. Trust sometimes occurs in the extreme form of blind faith, as with those who believe in papal infallibility. Yet, trust is not simply a dichotomous variable; it varies widely between the extremes of blind faith and complete distrust. Trust is typically accompanied by some form of calculation, whether risks are to some extent understood. As Lewis and Weigert (1985) argue, "trust is based on a cognitive process which discriminates among persons" (p. 970) who are trustworthy, distrusted, and unknown. Trust has a rational, experiential basis. We may not calculate risks and probabilities, but we do make decisions in deciding whom to trust and with what we entrust them (Baier, 1986) . Because our ability to calculate and predict the future is limited, trust may simply begin where prediction ends (Lewis & Weigert, 1985, p. 976) . Put another way, prediction is based on evidence; trust is based on the lack of contrary evidence (Gambetta, 1988, p. 234) .
We know trust exists because of the emotional sense of betrayal that is aroused when it is breached (Baier, 1986, p. 235; Lewis & Weigert, 1985, p. 971; Williamson, 1993, p. 482 ). When we calculate expected payoffs, we are disappointed if we make the wrong choice, but we do not feel betrayed. Betrayal is an indicator of the presence of trust, including fiduciary trust. Watergate evoked feelings of betrayal, not simply regret over a poorly calculated electoral choice.
Mutual trust is a component of public trust in government. Although some might fear that public-private relationships built on mutual trust will lead to capture or cooptation, these outcomes tend to arise when decisions are made by a few individuals behind closed doors rather than in an open public forum. It is certainly possible for public servants to fulfill their fiduciary obligations and develop open relationships of mutual trust with individual citizens. If we nurture both fiduciary and mutual trust, particularly through an ethic of care, then we can increasingly avoid quid pro quo relationships based on guile and the mind-numbing rules and procedures used to control such relationships. Relying solely on fiduciary trust as a means for producing and maintaining public trust denies street-level bureaucrats the opportunity to develop relationships of mutual trust with their clients.
SOCIAL TRUST
Even if economic transactions are solely calculative, it is nevertheless true that they occur within social systems, which themselves may be based on trust. Indeed, Williamson (1993, pp. 475-476) concedes this point, arguing that social factors are exogenous to his analysis-culture, regulations, and professional norms simply constrain the set of choices available to calculating individuals. Yet, social factors do more than constrain the set of choices available to otherwise self-interested individuals; they shape motives and beliefs as well. Socialization leads individuals to be more or less self-interested and more or less calculating. Business schools, for example, presumably enhance the self-interested motivations of a self-selected sample of students, whereas schools of public policy, management, and administration imbue students with a sense of fiduciary obligation.
Mark Granovetter (1985) argues further that interpersonal relationships shape social factors. Granovetter critiques contemporary economists for gradually replacing an "undersocialized" view of individuals as atomized actors subject only to the use pursuit of self-interest with an "oversocialized" view, in which equally atomized individuals simply internalize social norms and are guided by them (pp. 484-485). The oversocialized perspective recognizes the existence and influence of social norms but discounts the influence of individual relations on the development of norms. As Granovetter argues, "culture is not a once-for-all influence but an ongoing process, continuously constructed and reconstructed during interaction" (p. 486). The existence and interaction of mutually trusting individuals, in other words, enhance a culture of trust or social trust.
Social trust is a form of "social capital," which a society gradually accumulates through the microlevel interactions of individuals and which then becomes a public good on which others draw (Putnam, 1993, p. 170) . Once it exists, social trust makes transactions more efficient (Arrow, 1974, p. 23) . Unfortunately, economic theory can only assume that trust is present or absent; it cannot predict the conditions that create or erode trust, nor can it tell us the degree to which trust is present. The assumptions underlying the model of perfect competition, for example, do not include or require trust because economic exchange theoretically occurs under conditions of perfect information and numerous suppliers and demanders. In this imaginary world, individuals can completely specify a contract, and if one party breaks the contract, numerous others exist with whom contracts can be made. In this repeated-game environment, individuals are driven to live up to their contracts because their reputation is a capital asset.
No market is perfect, however, and in less than perfect markets some amount of trust must exist prior to contracting (Neu, 1991b, p. 245) . Because it is prohibitively costly, if not cognitively impossible, for contracts to include specifications of all possible contingencies, most exchanges rest on background assumptions (Garfinkel, 1964) , in which the parties to a contract trust that each will act according to expectations that are not covered in the contract itself (Dasgupta, 1988, pp. 52-53; Macneil, 1978) . This is reflected in Macaulay's (1963, p. 61) observation that businessmen avoid calling out their lawyers whenever discrepancies between contracts and outcomes arise. Businessmen also "welcome a measure of vagueness in the obligations they assume so that they may negotiate matters in light of the actual circumstances" (pp. 63-64) and thus maintain long-term business relationships. Even competitive relationships depend on social trust, because competing in a mutually nondestructive way requires trusting competitors to comply with at least some basic rules. As Adam Smith once noted, "if there is any society among robbers and murderers, they must at least . . . abstain from robbing and murdering one another" (cited in Gambetta, 1988, p. 214) .
Although social trust is not something we think about in our daily lives, it nevertheless permeates and eases our day-to-day existence. Luhmann (1979) , for example, argues that humans need to trust to reduce the complexity of even the most routine decisions. In his oft-cited opening passage, Luhmann writes the following:
Trust, in the broadest sense of confidence in one's expectations, is a basic fact of social life. In many situations, of course, man can choose in certain respects whether or not to bestow trust. But a complete absence of trust would prevent him even from getting up in the morning. He would be prey to a vague sense of dread, to paralysing fears. He would not even be capable of formulating definite distrust and making that a basis for precautionary measures, since this would presuppose trust in other directions. Anything and everything would be possible. Such abrupt confrontation with the complexity of the world at its most extreme is beyond human endurance. (p. 4) Garfinkel's (1963 Garfinkel's ( , 1964 breaching experiments demonstrated the degree to which stable interactions are based on things known in common and taken for granted, and which thereby reduce the complexity of social life. In one experiment, Garfinkel (1964) instructed his students to engage unsuspecting friends or strangers in conversation and to act on the assumption that the other's motivations were hidden and thus that everything the person said was not to be trusted:
One student spoke for several when she said she was unable to get any results because so much of her effort was directed to maintaining an attitude of distrust that she was unable to follow the conversation. She said she was unable to imagine how her fellow conversationalists might be deceiving her because they were talking about such inconsequential matters. (p. 234) A world of distrust is essentially senseless because events appear "atypical, causally indeterminate, and arbitrary in occurrence, without a relevant history or future . . . or moral necessity" (Garfinkel, 1963, p. 189) . Because all possible contingencies would have to be accounted for at every step, and because human rationality is bounded, pure distrust is impossible outside of a hermit's existence, even for routine social interactions. Therefore, people come to "trust in trust"-the idea that trust is indispensable and that we can assume it is so regarded by others (Gambetta, 1988; Luhmann, 1979, p. 67) .
Although social trust occurs in the aggregate, it cannot be clearly delineated from either mutual trust or fiduciary trust. They are interwoven and mutually supportive. Mutual trust, generated through microlevel interpersonal relationships, gives rise to and shapes the character of social trust. In turn, social trust enhances the ability of individuals to develop mutual trust. Social trust also buttresses the sense of moral obligation that sustains fiduciary trust. Because social trust provides a requisite basis for stable, concerted interaction in a society, we can assume that some degree of trust always exists. Accordingly, the relevant question is not, How can we produce trust? but rather, How can we produce more trust and maintain the trust we already have?
THE PRODUCTION OF TRUST
Lynne Zucker (1986) identified three modes of trust production. Characteristic-based trust is tied to personal characteristics, such as family background and ethnicity; process-based trust is produced through repeated exchanges; and institutional-based trust is produced through formal institutional processes, such as professional certification and government regulation. By focusing on trust production, Zucker's relatively simple typology provides insight into the cognitive, emotional, and behavioral levels at which trust operates, as well as the respective problems associated with the production of trust. The typology is evolutionary rather than based on mutually exclusive categories; institutional-based trust gradually supplants characteristic-based trust and process-based trust as a society becomes increasingly complex and differentiated.
CHARACTERISTIC-BASED TRUST
Characteristic-based trust is produced through personal characteristics, such as race, gender, and family background, that "serve as indicators of membership in a common cultural system" (Zucker, 1986, p. 63) . Given that humans need to trust to interact, personal characteristics are a simple heuristic for deciding whether other individuals share similar background expectations. Characteristic-based trust is most prevalent in small communities that seldom interact with outsiders. It is also present in complex modern societies as evidenced by individuals who cross the street to avoid strangers who appear different.
Because it is relatively difficult to change personal characteristics, the most viable means for building characteristic-based trust is to socialize with persons possessing similar characteristics. Accordingly, agency managers could strategically place employees in specific positions, such that employee characteristics match those of targeted communities. For example, a White geophysicist from an Ivy League university, employed by the U.S. Department of Energy to study potential sites for a radioactive waste repository in the American West, would be an unlikely recipient of characteristic-based trust from individuals in a Native American community. Conversely, Michael Jordan, sitting on an advisory committee or task force, could be a valuable spokesperson for the Department of Housing and Urban Development.
Pursuing only a characteristic-based strategy for building public trust would be rather shallow, of course, because individuals in complex societies do not invest much energy in a trusting relationship based solely on ascribed characteristics. Moreover, agency employees and spokespersons would eventually become tainted by agency pathologies and the conflictual nature of the political environment. By itself, characteristic-based trust is not a viable means for producing public trust in government agencies and their employees.
PROCESS-BASED TRUST
Process-based trust is produced through repeated exchanges rather than through ascribed characteristics and, thus, emerges over time. Whereas process-based trust may be facilitated by characteristic-based trust, initial exchanges may also be motivated by self-interest, with no trust already present. Once an economic-exchange relationship is initiated, however, subsequent exchanges increasingly "become overlaid with social content that carries strong expectations of trust and abstention from opportunism" (Granovetter, 1985, p. 490) . Repeated exchanges also become increasingly governed by norms geared to the preservation of the relationship itself (Macaulay, 1963; Macneil, 1978) .
The value of goods exchanged also affects the production of processbased trust.
5 Haas and Deseran (1981, p. 3), expanding on Blau's theory of exchange relationships, introduced the concept of symbolic exchange, a type of social exchange that captures the economic value of goods changing hands in a trust-producing relationship:
The goods are symbolic in the sense that their principal utility lies in their capacity to symbolize the nature of the relationship between the receiver and the giver of the gifts. They are also symbolic in the sense that their high cost to the giver serves as a token of the giver's good faith.
Although some exchanges, such as a wave or a handshake, have little or no utilitarian value, other exchanges, such as an invitation to a dinner party, lie somewhere between social and economic exchange because they have both symbolic and utilitarian value. The utilitarian dimension of the exchange represents its intrinsic or economic value, whereas the symbolic or communicative dimension conveys information about the desire of the giver to enter into a trust-building relationship. In addition to offers of food, drink, and gifts, symbolic exchange includes attendance at formal ceremonies. Because the utilitarian importance of ceremonial attendance is measured in the time it requires, "an important person whose time is known to be valuable can express a considerable commitment to a person or a group merely by attending" (Haas & Deseran, 1981, p. 8) .
Refusing symbolic or social exchanges is a gesture indicating distaste for entering into a trust-building relationship and could be interpreted as a sign of distrust toward the giver (Blau, 1964, pp. 107-108; Haas & Deseran, 1981, pp. 8-9) . Even if a symbolic or social exchange is accepted, paying off debts quickly may be interpreted as a refusal to enter into a long-term relationship or even as a sign of mistrust (Luhmann, 1979, p. 44) . As Blau (1964) argues, "social bonds are fortified by remaining obligated to others as well as by trusting them to discharge their obligations for considerable periods" (p. 99). Therefore, unlike economic exchange, in which rapid repayment of debts is usually expected, eagerness to discharge a social obligation may be interpreted as ingratitude.
Public officials are in a bind when attempting to build process-based trust with individuals outside of government through symbolic or social exchange. Many types of public-private exchanges are frowned upon in the United States because of the fear they will cement quid pro quo relationships with special interests. Yet, if a public employee refuses such exchanges, she risks producing distrust because refusals might be interpreted by individuals in the agency's environment as an indication that the employee-and, by implication, the agency-does not want to enter into reciprocal obligations and is therefore not worthy of trust. Ceremonial attendance, however, provides a good opportunity for public officials to build process-based trust, depending on the rank of the official. High-level political appointees, whose time is greatly valued, can instill a great deal of public trust with a single exchange, whereas individuals at lower levels of the hierarchy would have to rely on repeated attendance to build a similar amount of trust.
Tenure longevity is thus an important requisite for midlevel line managers, program managers, and street-level bureaucrats to produce processbased trust. Employee rotation systems impede trust production by limiting the number of times public officials can interact with specific individuals in an agency's environment. Moving employees from one place to another, like other organizational decisions, has both costs and benefits. Herbert Kaufman (1960) once extolled the U.S. Forest Service for maintaining a cohesive sense of mission despite its far-flung organizational structure. In part, the Forest Service achieved cohesiveness by rotating forest rangers every few years to new locations before they could develop personal relationships with, and become captured by, local residents (Kaufman, 1960, p. 217 ). Yet, the existence of close working relationships does not necessarily imply capture. Behind closed doors, repeated interactions among few individuals take on the appearance, if not the substance, of capture. Conversely, if agency employees interact with multiple interests simultaneously in public forums, then capture is less likely to occur.
Indeed, as Daniel Kemmis (1990) suggests, public officials can play the role of facilitators and consensus-builders among multiple interests in society, particularly at the local level. Rather than taking sides on policy issues, or mediating between interest groups although following organizational procedures, agency employees can serve as facilitators, bringing citizens together in search of collaborative solutions. 6 In the short run, each consensus-building group generates mutual trust, and in the long run, adds to the collective pool of social trust from which the entire society benefits (Putnam, 1993) . Although multi-interest collaboration is a relatively new phenomenon in the United States, it offers an important opportunity for agency employees to produce process-based trust in their environment. If practiced routinely, the collaborative process itself might some day become institutionalized or taken for granted.
INSTITUTIONAL-BASED TRUST
Institutional-based trust is produced through institutions that have become accepted as social facts and are therefore seldom questioned. Zucker (1986) argues that institutional-based trust became increasingly important after the 19th century as immigration and internal migration pulled apart the insular communities within which characteristic-based trust predominated. The increasingly complex and volatile economy also limited process-based trust as exchanges were made at ever greater geographic distances and as firms formed, merged, and folded with increasing frequency. In this context, institutional-based trust expanded to provide alternative guarantees for exchanges. Professional credentials served as an alternative to personal reputation; financial intermediaries (e.g., banks, brokers, and independent accountants) bridged distant exchange partners; and government regulations and laws provided a common framework for exchange, including general expectations and specific rules governing transactions. Zucker (1986) identifies two types of institutional-based trust. The first type is specific to persons or organizations because it "rests on membership in a subculture within which carefully delineated specific expectations are expected to hold, at least in some cases based on detailed prior socialization" (p. 63). Professionals, for example, evoke fiduciary trust through the integrity of the social process through which the knowledge base of the profession is itself derived and applied, rather than through personal integrity or claims to expertise (Bella, 1987) . Rigorous education and peer reviews, as well as constant conformance to codes of ethics, are signals to the public that professionals do not define their responsibilities solely through self-interest or organizational assignments. Accordingly, individuals and firms join professional associations and acquire credentials and licenses in part to signal to others that they intend to abide by certain rules and codes of conduct (Neu, 1991a, p. 188) . Private organizations voluntarily adopt standard practices to signal the organization's willingness to conform to expectations in its environment (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Zucker, 1986, pp. 90-94) . Public agencies similarly signal conformance with social expectations, and thereby produce institutional-based trust, by adopting the latest administrative fad-be it zero-base budgeting, total quality management, or reengineering.
A second type of institutional-based trust is produced through intermediary mechanisms such as laws, regulation, and insurance. Zucker (1986) provides a pithy illustration of the social transition from interpersonal trust to this form of institutional trust:
If you do not trust your neighbor to participate in a "barn-raising" after your house burns, you have to buy insurance; if you do not trust immigrants to behave according to common understandings . . . , then you have to "reform" city governments to give them less power by formalizing personnel procedures; if you do not trust corporations to behave "fairly" and ethically, then you have to formalize interorganizational relations by enacting antitrust rules (p. 69) Principal-agent relationships also serve as intermediary mechanisms for producing institutional-based trust. Because fiduciary relationships have become increasingly prevalent in modern society, numerous guardians (or trustees) of trust now oversee these impersonal relationships, which have become increasingly layered to assure individual actors that their affairs are being well managed (Shapiro, 1987, p. 649) . Although such redundancy can strengthen institutional-based trust, this outcome cannot be assured. Neu's (1991a) study of the Canadian securities market, for example, found regulators developing tacit agreements amongst themselves regarding regulatory responsibilities, but not routinely informing one another of changes in operating practices. Although gaps in institutional rules had not yet occurred, Neu (1991a, p. 194 ) believed these two factors, in conjunction, increased the probability of opportunistic violations of trust.
The research on institutional-based trust suggests several ways in which public organizations can produce trust in their environment. For example, because impersonal trust is signaled through the possession of academic and professional credentials, agency personnel can acquire credentials similar to or respected by members of the attentive public. These credentials will serve as a signal that the agency adheres to the same standards and codes of conduct as others in the targeted community. There is an organizational cost to this method of trust production, however, because professional associations usually have goals that differ somewhat from those of the agency; and these goals may also differ with some segments of the agency's clientele. Thus, agency managers must weigh potential gains in public trust among some segments of the public against increased conflict of interest within the agency, and possibly even a loss of trust among some of the agency's clientele.
Another means for producing institutional-based trust is regulation. Public agencies can call for increased regulation of their activities, thereby providing additional fiduciary layers. This strategy assumes of course that the public trusts the (new) regulator to carry out its duties. Agency managers can also call for additional legislative oversight, as well as new laws mandating that other agencies conduct external reviews or set performance standards. Interagency regulation is not unusual (e.g., the Tennessee Valley Authority must comply with the Environmental Protection Agency's air pollution requirements), but interagency compliance is difficult to achieve at the national level because lines of accountability are unclear (Wilson & Rachal, 1977) . At the intergovernmental level, public trust in federal agencies might be bolstered if they are monitored (or even regulated) by local or state agencies, because surveys suggest that local and state agencies are generally trusted more than federal agencies on issues with local origins (Muste, 1992) .
Attempts to achieve public trust through institutionalized procedural constraints may, however, limit otherwise desirable agency behavior. Although this article focuses on public trust in government, trust also has important effects on productivity within agencies (Carnevale & Wechsler, 1992; Culbert & McDonough, 1986; Daley, 1991) . Because trust permeates intraorganizational authority relationships (Bradach & Eccles, 1989) , hierarchical control systems that overemphasize rules (Kelman, 1990) or monitoring (Frey, 1993) may have the unintended effect of stifling performance. Moreover, as previously noted in the section on fiduciary trust, strict adherence to rules and procedures impedes the ability of public officials to take the interests of individual citizens into account, and thereby fulfill their fiduciary obligation in terms of an ethic based on care. Even institutions established for the purpose of caretaking can lose sight of their purpose in the face of rational proceduralism. As Noddings (1984) suggests, "Those entrusted with caring may focus on satisfying the formulated requirements for caretaking and fail to be present in their interactions with the cared-for. Thus caring disappears and only its illusion remains" (p. 26).
MAINTAINING TRUST-OR, HOW TRUST IS LOST
Given that some degree of trust underlies all social interactions, trust can always be lost as well as gained. Yet, trust is not necessarily produced and lost in similar-but opposite-fashions. Therefore, separate consideration is given in this section to methods for maintaining public trust.
One way in which trust can be lost is through the extensive use of contracts detailing the precise responsibilities of each party in the event of remote or unlikely contingencies (Macaulay, 1963, p. 64) . Not only is complete planning cognitively impossible and prohibitively costly, extensively detailed contracts imply a lack of trust because their purpose is to specify obligations and future returns-and thus to align expectations-when trust is low. The more contracts are used as a substitute for trust, the greater the signal of distrust or lack of trust. Neu (1991b, p. 247) refers to this as the "irony of contracting" because the use of contracts leads to a downward spiral characterized by the increasing use of contracts as imperfect alternatives for increasingly less trust. Unfortunately, detailed contracts may be necessary when exchanges involve complex performances to be performed over long periods of time, especially if the degree of injury in case of default is thought to be great (Macaulay, 1963, p. 65) . Agencies managing high-risk, high-hazard technologies might have no choice but to rely on contractual relationships.
Trust can also be lost when role expectations are in flux. Reichman's (1989) analysis of insider trading in the stock market found that organizational changes increase the probability of trust violations because cultural norms and role behaviors also change. According to Reichman (1989) , Role ambiguity helps free incumbents to believe that rules are bad or that they don't apply. When "anything goes," it is not so hard to justify deviant behavior as legitimate, "above," or "within the law." (p. 188) This suggests that an agency can maintain trust through organizational stability. If role changes create opportunities for trust violation by increasing ambiguity in role performance, then reorganizations are likely to generate distrust. Not only might reorganizations increase opportunities for actual violations of trust (and thus public expectations of future malfeasance), but organizational changes also may not conform with existing expectations in the organization's environment, giving rise to bewilderment and unease, and thereby decreasing current levels of trust. Because reorganization is a clumsy and relatively ineffective tool for achieving desired ends (Thomas, 1993) , it would not be surprising to find that one of its unintended side effects is the reduction of public trust.
Trust can also be lost through lying and the misuse of power. In her moral treatise on lying, Bok (1978) argues that individual lies not only erode trust between the liar and the recipient of the lie, each lie also wears away at the social system of trust that supports the institutions on which society is constructed. Her analysis is thus similar to the externalities argument in microeconomics, in that the full social cost of a lie is not borne completely by the liar. As an example, she notes that government officials often lie to the public to protect the secrecy of their programs, justifying these lies to themselves by arguing that program benefits outweigh the cost of the lie. In doing so, however, they fail to calculate the long-term, aggregate effect on the loss of public trust in government (Bok, 1978, pp. 27, 142) . Similarly, Kass (1990) argues that the misuse of power by a public official for personal, professional, or organizational ends erodes the trust on which the legitimacy of government depends:
Consistent violations by individual public agents, even if done in the name of the republic's welfare, ultimately raise the average individual's sense of vulnerability to the great power he or she has placed in this entity and adversely affects the legitimacy of both the agents involved and the republican association. (pp. 126-127) Finally, trust in professions can be lost through individual incompetence, as well as through complacency in the social process through which professional trust is sustained. Public trust in professions depends on selfcriticism within the profession. Constant peer review is a necessary means for preventing trustworthy communities from being "transformed into associations of self-serving functionaries" (Bella, 1987, p. 123) . In particular, Bella (1987, p. 124 ) warns professionals to avoid being captured by the needs and demands of the organization within which they work because organizational biases would then enter the self-regulatory process of the profession. Public managers seeking to nurture public trust should therefore encourage employees to participate actively in professional communities, and should refrain from using professions to produce or justify public policies in contentious policy arenas. The scientific-based professions, for example, lose their credibility when their processes become attached to conflicting policy positions (Wynne, 1987) . Self-serving professionals can also reduce public trust if they come to see the role of the professional not as someone giving advice but as someone with influence over policy. As March and Olsen (1989) argue, "The changed frame of reference tends to compromise the quality of expert information in the political process and to undermine trust not only in the individual expert but in the institution of expertise" (p. 32). Professionals are a source of public trust for government agencies because professional credentials signal the willingness of public employees (and, by extension, agencies) to conform to certain expectations; but this trust can only be maintained if these individuals remain grounded in the social processes of their respective professions and fulfill their fiduciary obligations.
SUMMARY
The means presented in this article for producing and maintaining public trust are hypothetical and inconclusive. Theories of trust constitute a rich and burgeoning literature, but this research is not currently geared to public trust in government. Although the hypotheses derived in this exploratory article provide a basis for discussing the production and maintenance of trust in government agencies and their employees, they have not been rigorously tested, and their relative effectiveness is therefore unknown. With these caveats in mind, the following means for producing and maintaining public trust are plausible.
First, reorganization should not be considered a panacea for agencies in which the relative absence of public trust is perceived to be hampering effective operations. In the short run, reorganizations are more likely to produce distrust by increasing opportunities for malfeasance due to role fluctuations, or by simply bewildering individuals in the agency's environment who have come to expect certain organizational behaviors. Measures short of wholesale reorganization are more likely to produce public trust. For example, because individuals are limited in their abilities to process information, they often rely on relatively simple heuristics, such as personal characteristics and professional affiliation, to make judgments about organizational trustworthiness. Therefore, agency managers might try matching the personal and professional characteristics of employees with targeted groups outside the agency, or appointing individuals outside the agency to sit on advisory boards. Managers can also encourage subordinates and peers to participate actively in professional communities as a means for signaling the agency's willingness to conform to institutionalized norms. In doing so, managers should refrain from using these professional processes and worldviews to justify contentious policy positions, and they should be wary of the self-serving tendencies of professions as well as the shallow nature of characteristic-based trust.
Regulations, oversight, and standard practices provide additional signals of institutional trustworthiness. Public employees should cooperate with government regulators, perhaps even publicly requesting increased oversight of agency operations to increase fiduciary redundancy. Lying and secrecy, of course, should be avoided. Professional schools of public policy, management, and administration also play an important role in these regards by providing an ethical-rather than simply a technocratic-foundation for public employees to aid them in defining and carrying out their fiduciary responsibilities. Because ethics is not currently part of the core curriculum at most of these schools, we should seriously consider raising the profile of ethics courses and adopting care as an ethical standard for producing public trust.
The literature on contracts is relatively ambiguous regarding the production and maintenance of trust. Detailed contracts align expectations when trust is weak, but such contracts also signal the absence of trust by one or more parties to the contract. Given that detailed contracts may be necessary when exchanges involve complex or hazardous activities performed over long periods of time, agency officials might have no option but to accept the necessity of detailed contracts under these circumstances. They can counteract some of the negative consequences of contracts by shoring up trust through other means, including symbolic or social exchanges. Although public officials are limited in their ability to participate in gift exchanges, ceremonial attendance at various social functions is feasible and is a productive means for building trust with specific groups in the agency's environment, depending on the rank of the official. In this regard, tenure longevity for street-level bureaucrats and midlevel managers is particularly important for building process-based trust. Public officials can also generate process-based trust by participating in consensus-building groups composed of multiple interests.
In closing, it should be noted that the existing literature on trust focuses primarily on private exchanges between individuals and market-based exchanges between firms. Because political exchanges are different from private exchanges, extrapolating from the private sector to the public sector may be a suspect exercise. March and Olsen (1989) , for example, note that building a culture of trust in political organizations is "severely strained by exploitative political leaders, and may indeed be impossible to sustain in many heterogeneous societies with deep, persistent social cleavages and traditions of minimal regulation of conflict" (p. 34). Although pessimistic, their analysis is illuminating in the context of this article. Producing trust in government at a macrolevel may indeed be extraordinarily difficult in a heterogeneous society such as the United States, but public officials can nevertheless produce trust within their agency's environment. The means presented in this article are general and relatively modest, but they suggest that trust can be produced and maintained on the margin if agency officials adhere persistently to them. 
